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THE SERVANTSt
Stephan Landsman*
BARRISTERS' CLERKS, THE LAW'S MIDDLEMEN. By John Flood.
Manchester, England: Manchester University Press. 1983. Pp. vii,
164. $22.

I.

THE WORLD OF THE ENGLISH BAR

Even before the advent of Rumpole of the Bailey, 1 it was common
knowledge in America that England has a bifurcated legal profession
comprised of bewigged courtroom advocates (barristers) and businesssuited clients' representatives (solicitors). 2 Few Americans, however,
have progressed far beyond this bright-line distinction. One of the
great values of John Flood's book, Barristers' Clerks, The Law's Middlemen, is that in its brief span it affords the reader access to an important corner of the world of English legal practice and thereby helps to
elucidate the entire English system.
In order to understand what barristers' clerks do it is necessary to
understand a number of things about their masters. Barristers are specialists most of whose work is concerned with issues arising out of
potential litigation. The process leading to admission to practice is
both time-consuming and costly. First, candidates must be "called to
the Bar." In order to be called each applicant must affiliate with one
of the four Inns of Court. 3 Affiliation can only be achieved if the can-

t

The author wishes to thank William Twining, Michael Zander, Myron Glazer, Lars
Mosesson and Janice Toran for their assistance in the preparation of this review.
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. B.A.
1969, Kenyon College; J.D. 1972, Harvard University. Professor Landsman's research on the
history of the adversary system took him to London, where he completed this review. - Ed.
1. Although John Mortimer was the creator of the rotund barrister-sleuth featured in
RUMPOLE OF THE BAILEY (1980), THE TRIALS OF RUMPOLE (1981) and RUMPOLE'S RETURN
(1982), it is the actor Leo McKern who, through his television portrayal, has come to personify
for many Americans the archetypal English barrister.
2. Solicitors are, however, permitted to appear and argue in "county courts, magistrates'
courts, certain proceedings in the Crown Court, certain tribunals and • • • bankruptcy matters in
the High Court." R. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 235 (5th ed. 1980) (footnotes
omitted).
3. The four Inns are Inner Temple, Middle Temple, Gray's Inn and Lincoln's Inn. The Inns
were originally the living and dining quarters of medieval advocates. Over a number of centuries
they evolved into societies charged by the judiciary with the responsibility of overseeing the
training and conduct of barristers. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HlsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 41431 (1st ed. 1909); 4 w. HOLDSWORTH, supra (3d ed. 1924), at 263-72; 12 w. HOLDSWORTH,
supra (6th ed. 1938), at 15-40; R. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JusncE IN ENGLAND 426-28
(7th ed. 1977). Today they act collegially to regulate the members of the Bar through a Senate
established in 1966. See R. WALKER, supra note 2, at 253.
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didate satisfies a general educational requirement and undertakes preliminary vocational training,4 "keeps term" by regularly dining at one
of the Inns, 5 demonstrates good moral character, 6 avoids involvement
in certain unacceptable occupations,7 and pays the requisite fees. 8
Once called to the Bar candidates must undertake an uncompensated twelve-month apprenticeship (pupilage) with a senior barrister
(pupil master). 9 Upon successful completion of the pupilage a barrister is eligible to practice. The new barrister can only do so, however, if
accepted as a member of a set of chambers (usually described as obtaining a "tenancy" in that set). Chambers are somewhat similar to
American law offices, 10 but their establishment and operation are rigidly controlled by the Inns of Court to insure the independence of each
barrister. In London, where the vast majority of barristers practice, 11
virtually all chambers are located within the confines of the four
Inns. 12 The number of places in chambers is severely circumscribed
and more than one-half of those seeking a tenancy may not find one. 13
Although barristers must join a set of chambers, each is considered a
sole practitioner and is prohibited from entering into any partnership
4. See R. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 437-42; M. ZANDER, LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE COM•
MUNITY 176 (1978).

5. Dining in one's Inn a certain number of times per term for twelve terms is part of the
process of qualification. On application it can be done in the year of the vocational course
and the year after Call. Dining costs in all between £2S and £40 depending on the Inn plus the cost of travel and overnight accommodation for those who come from out of
London.
M. ZANDER, supra note 4, at 377 n.32.
6. Id. at 176.
7. Prohibited professions include solicitor, patent agent and parliamentary agent as well as
"any other occupation which in the opinion of the Masters of the Bench 'is incompatible with the
position of a student seeking call to the Bar.' " Id. (quoting CoNSOLIDATED REGULATIONS OP
THE HONOURABLE SOCIETIES OF LINCOLN'S INN, INNER TEMPLE, MIDDLE TEMPLE AND
GRAY'S INN).
8. For an English student from an English university, fees are likely to include: admission to
the Inn (£82-85); tuition for vocational training (£320); bar examination (£20); and call to the
Bar (£7S) (all figures as of 1976). Id. at 376-77.
9. "Any barrister who has continuously practiced for five years may take on a pupil, The
pupil reads his pupilmaster's papers, follows him to Court, and occasionally does some drafting
for him.'' P. 12 n.10.
10. Chambers are similar to traditional partnerships because there is a mutual fund of goodwill, a system for work and fee sharing, see note 40 infra and accompanying text, and a regular
sharing of expenses. Hazell, Clerks and Fees, in THE BAR ON TRIAL 99, 124 (R. Hazell ed.
1978). But see note 14 infra and accompanying text.

11. See M. ZANDER, supra note 4, at 28 (In 1977 there were 3881 barristers in practice; of
this number only 1127 (29%) practice wholly or in large measure outside London,),
12. Today there is no requirement that all chambers be located in the four Inns of Court. See
W. BoULTON, A GUIDE TO CoNDUCT AND ETIQUETI'E AT THE BAR OP ENGLAND AND WALES
61 (5th ed. 1975). However, as late as 1965 barristers were being disbarred for practicing in
London chambers located outside one of the four Inns. See B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, IN
SEARCH OP JUSTICE 103 (1968).
13. See Hazell, Introduction to the Bar, in THE BAR ON TRIAL, supra note 10, at 22.
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arrangements. 14 Each must develop and sustain his or her own
practice.
Regulations regarding legal practice tightly constrain the conduct
of members of the Bar. Barristers are neither allowed to seek legal
business, 15 nor to have unmediated contact with lay clients. 16 Virtually all consultations and employment are initiated, arranged and
overseen by solicitors. Traditionally, barristers have been expected to
serve clients on a first-come-first-served basis (a principle referred to
as the "cab-rank rule"). 17 Any solicitor is free, at least in theory, to
avail his client of the services of any barrister. Once retained, the barrister must rely on the solicitor to do virtually all the factual investigation required to prepare the case for trial. It is the solicitor's
responsibility to interview witnesses and identify the evidentiary
materials that will be presented in court. 18 In the usual case ending in
a trial, the barrister's only functions are courtroom advocacy and steps
taken in preparation for courtroom appearances.
Barristers are prohibited from directly negotiating fees for their
services. 19 Compensation is generally fixed by an agreement between
the solicitor and the barrister's clerk. For this reason, among others, it
is required that each barrister have a clerk. 20 Payments to barristers
for work performed are classified as honoraria and cannot be recovered by legal action. As a concomitant no contract is held to exist
14. Despite the similarities of chambers to partnership arrangements, see note 10 supra, bar95ters are said to be forbidden to engage in any sort of practice "in the least degree resembling
partnership." W. BOULTON, supra note 12, at 6.
15. "Any form of advertising or touting by a barrister is contrary to professional etiquette."
W. BOULTON, supra note 12, at 7 (footnote omitted). It should be noted that barristers' obligations "are governed solely by the pictates of professional etiquette." R. WALKER, supra note 2,
at 258.
16. "The general rule is that barristers do not see or advise clients or accept briefs or appear
as advocates on behalf of clients without the intervention of a solicitor." W. BOULTON, supra
note 12, at 8 (footnote omitted). This is a custom of rather recent origin, not recognized until the
eighteenth century. See R. WALKER, supra note 2, at 235 n.3.
17. "Counsel is bound to accept any brief in the Courts in which he professes to practise at a
proper professional fee dependent on the length and difficulty of the case, but special circumstances may justify his refusal, at his discretion, to accept a particular brief." W. BOULTON, supra
note 12, at 6 (footnote omitted).
18. "It is recognised practice that witnesses (other than the parties and experts or professional witnesses who are instructing counsel), should not be present at consultations or conferences with counsel and that counsel should not interview such witnesses before or during a trial."
Id. at 12. See also R. MEGARRY, LAWYER AND LmGANT IN ENGLAND 46-48 (1962) (claiming
that the purpose of this rule is to reduce the risk of witness tampering).
19. "Brief fees are fixed by arrangment between the instructing solicitor or his clerk, and
counsel's clerk, but it is permissible in cases of special difficulty for counsel to discuss the amount
of a fee personally with the instructing solicitor." W. BOULTON, supra note 12, at 50 (footnote
omitted). Traditionally barristers have had no desire to get involved in the fee fixing process. As
Megarry states, "Fees are clerk's business, and counsel gratefully and trustingly leaves it to him."
R. MEGARRY, supra note 18, at 60.
20. See W. BOULTON, supra note 12, at 6.
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between barristers and those who employ them. 21 Barristers are immune from actions for breach of contract and from malpractice claims
related to services provided either at trial or in preparing a case for
trial. 22
The barristers' clerk is the administrator employed by all the barristers in a set of chambers to conduct the business of that chambers
and of each affiliated barrister. The clerk is responsible for "negotiating his barristers' fees and collecting them, obtaining work for his barristers, supervising their and the chambers' accounts, helping to
schedule cases and checking the daily court lists for his barristers and
the solicitors" (p. 3). The clerk is the intermediary who bridges the
legally mandated gaps separating barrister from solicitor and client.
He also manages the internal functioning of chambers. In this capacity the clerk serves as intermediary between younger and older barristers as well as the manager of each barrister's career. The clerk is the
servant who relieves his masters of the day-to-day chores involved in
making a living by practicing law.

II.

STUDYING BARRISTERS' CLERKS

John Flood calls his work an "ethnographic" study of barristers'
clerks (p. 134). By this he means a detailed description and analysis of
"the culturally significant behaviors of a . . . small well-defined community" (p. 150 n.1). Such a study requires "prolonged face-to-face
contacts with members of the local group, direct participation in some
of the group's activities, and a greater emphasis on intensive work
with informants than on the use of documentary or survey data" (p.
150 n.1). In carrying out his study, Flood, then a graduate student in
socio-legal studies at the School of Law of the University of Warwick,
spent months among barristers' clerks. He lived their life, shared their
work, and assumed their outlook. The product of these experiences is
a book that succeeds in shedding light upon a previously unknown
part of the legal world.
Flood's study begins with an examination of clerks' career patterns. Clerks most frequently begin their careers at school-leaving
age, 23 when they are hired into chambers as errand boys. Boys are
selected and carefully supervised by the senior clerk in each set of
chambers. The boys are predominantly "white British males" of
working class background and are likely to share the sexual and ethnic
21. See Ronde! v. W., [1966] 3 All E.R. 657, 661-64 (C.A. 1966) (Lord Denning, M.R.,
detailing history of rules prohibiting both suits for fees and contracts between barristers and
clients), affd. sub nom. Ronde! v. Worsley, [1967] 3 All E.R. 993 (H.L. 1967); R. WALKER, supra
note 2, at 255 (relation between barrister and client sui generis).
22. See Ronde! v. W., [1966] 3 All E.R. at 661-62, 667.
23. In an earlier era school-leaving age might have been 13 or 14. Today it is generally a bit
older. P. 17.
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prejudices that predominate among their seniors (p. 18). Virtually all
a boy's training is of the practical variety and the boy who demonstrates an aptitude for clerking will, within a couple of years, be promoted to the position of junior clerk. He is likely to remain a junior
clerk for an extended period (ten or more years is not uncommon) (p.
23). A junior clerk usually receives a fixed salary and carries out most
of the routine functions necessary to the operation of chambers. Eventually, successful juniors will make application for a senior clerk position. Almost invariably application is made in a different set of
chambers than those in which the applicant has previously worked.
The senior clerk is in charge of all the administrative operations of
chambers. He is generally paid on a commission basis, receiving up to
ten percent of each of his barrister's fees. In a large chambers (of
which there are a great many today) the senior clerk is likely to earn a
significantly higher salary than most of his junior barristers.24
The clerk's career is remarkably insular. From a very early age
boys are immersed in the world of the Inns of Court. They are supervised, counselled and judged exclusively by their senior colleagues.
Not even barristers seem to have much direct influence on a clerk's
training or behavior. 25 Their allegiance is to their isolated fraternity.
In this environment prejudices against outsiders and new ideas are
likely to be accentuated (p. 18).
According to Flood, clerks see themselves as the architects of their
barristers' careers. New barristers often need clerks to find them
work. Neophytes have little reputation to trade on and may get little
business unless their clerks take matters in hand. Despite this dependency, formal relations between barrister and clerk emphasize the barrister's superior status. The clerk always addresses his barristers
formally, 26 while they address him by his Christian name (p. 39).
Flood suggests that behind this facade the clerk holds real power over
young barristers because he is responsible for the negotiation and collection of all their fees. Moreover, it is the clerk who is charged with
the responsibility of dealing with pupils and tenants who fail to secure
the situations they seek. He eases the rejected pupil out of chambers
and adjusts barrister expectations to match limited prospects. To
Flood this suggests that the clerk is the puppet-master who controls
his barristers. "By quietly manipulating unseen strings the clerk
prompts and restrains his governors' behavior . . . ." (p. 55).
Although Flood contends that the clerk may be of critical impor24. See M. ZANDER, THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFES31 (1980) (quoting 1 FINAL REPORT OF THE ROYAL CoMMISSION ON LEGAL SERVICES
487 (1979)).
25. See, e.g., Hazell, supra note 10, at 113 (In 1974, the Bar Council refused to allow a pupil
even to spend time observing the operation of a clerk's office.).
26. Barristers are generally referred to as "Sir," "Mr. - , " "Miss," "Miss-" or "Mrs.
- . " Pp. 39, 61 n.11.
SION
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tance to senior as well as junior barristers, most of the evidence suggests that senior members of the Bar are free of clerk control. 27 In
essence, it is the young who are subjected to the clerk's domination.
Flood thinks that this arrangment is perpetuated because it provides
the Bar with an effective way of deterring rapid expansion and minimizes the power of new barristers. The clerk serves as the " 'gatekeeper' or filter" through which barristers are screened (p. 132).
Clerks help assure that not too many young barristers pass through to
threaten the positions or economic well-being of their senior brethren.
The clerk is also useful because his prejudices (especially against women and ethnic minorities) mirror the unarticulated biases of the Bar
and can be relied upon to help exclude outsiders from the club (p.
132). Flood concludes, "The Bar maintains clean hands while the
clerks do its dirty work" (p. 133).
Flood provides a detailed analysis of the sources of barristers' business and the clerks' role in business getting. Because barristers are prohibited by ethical constraints from seeking work directly it is up to the
clerks to make the arrangements that keep barristers busy. Clerks do
this by maintaining contact with those solicitors, solicitors' clerks and
government officials28 who have legal work to distribute. Within limits clerks are expected to tout all these potential sources of business.
The clerks' goal is to establish ongoing relationships that will ensure a
steady flow of cases into chambers. Solicitors are to be kept as happy
as possible. Clerks must carefully attend to each solicitor's interests
and even go so far as to defend solicitors against their barristers when
the latter insist on the collection of outstanding fees (p. 74). In the
clerks' world the most important thing is the steady flow of business.
Therefore, clerks seldom attempt to inflate individual fees, struggling
instead to maintain fees at a level that will guarantee continued custom (p. 76).
27. See text following note 39 infra. The one important exception to this proposition is that
barristers often rely on advice from their clerks in deciding whether to seek elevation to the
special position of Queen's Counsel (Q.C.):
Originally Queen's Counsel were appointed for the work of the Crown, but by the end of the
eighteenth century it became a regular practice for successful men to apply for the appointment. The appointment is made by the Lord Chancellor; there are no qualifications, but it is
understood that at least ten years' standing is required, together with an indefinable degree
of success as a junior. The purpose of becoming a Queen's Counsel has for long had nothing
to do with Crown work; the old rule that he must not appear against the Crown now means
that leave to do so must be obtained, as when he appears for the defence in a criminal case,
but the leave is given automatically. A number of conventions give Queen's Counsel the
position of a superior grade of barrister.
R. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 429. Special advice may be needed because the kinds of work Q.C.s
can perform are limited and, therefore, practical judgments about business prospects are a necessary part of the decision-making process.
28. ''The Bar's remuneration survey conducted for the Royal Commission showed that barristers earn 43 per cent of their income from public funds (16 per cent for prosecution work, 19
per cent from criminal legal aid and 8 percent from civil legal aid) ••• ," M. ZANDER, supra
note 4, at 37. For a somewhat more detailed description of the kinds of work done, see B. ADEL·
SMITH & R. STEVENS, supra note 12, at 112-14.
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Once a flow of work has been assured, clerks are likely to attempt
to upgrade the quality of cases taken. This is done by declining minor
cases and by favoring matters brought in by "better-quality firms" of
solicitors (p. 70). Notwithstanding the cab-rank rule, clerks pick and
choose among the cases offered their barristers. By asking excessive
fees or emphasizing the likelihood of long delays clerks are able to
control the flow of business. According to Flood, the clerks' approach
to business selection has rendered the cab-rank rule "substantially a
myth" (p. 80).
Each clerk's objective is to have all his barristers fully occupied.
To achieve this end the clerk books as much work as possible for each
barrister. Because of the vagaries inherent in legal practice and judicial scheduling there is frequent overbooking.29 When a barrister is
overbooked some of his work must be returned to the solicitors who
engaged him and new counsel must be found to handle the returned
brief. Most often briefs are returned at the last moment, permitting
the new barrister very little time to prepare. In these circumstances
the quality of representation is bound to suffer. "The frenetic pace of
activity [resulting in the return or reassignment of briefs] . . . creates
a 'battery farm' atmosphere which tends to dehumanise the clients'
cases" (p. 72).

Ill.

STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS

Perhaps the greatest strength of Barristers' Clerks is its wealth of
detailed information about the clerks' milieu. Flood's first-hand observations and anecdotal illustrations bring the world of the Inns of
Court to life. We are shown the real stuff of the clerks' job and from it
can construct a clearer picture of legal practice in England. Flood's
intimate contact with the clerks has led him to adopt a sympathetic
view of their ways. His friendly attitude is of great value as a counterbalance to the generally negative attitudes adopted by a number of
other modern commentators. 30 He is especially effective in refuting
the critics' charge that clerks inflate legal fees in individual cases as a
means of augmenting their income. 31 In this instance, and throughout
the book, Flood places the clerks in the context of a system broader
than the single case and intelligently assesses the pressures that lead
them to act as they do.
Flood's work also helps dispel a number of myths about the ·English Bar. For example, he carefully scrutinizes the claim that barris29. See Hazell, supra note 10, at 120.
30. For commentary critical of barristers' clerks, see B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, supra
note 12, at 288; M. ZANDER, LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 83-95 (1968); Hazell, supra
note 10, at 105-24.
31. See text following note 28 supra. Such charges are made in all the sources cited at note
30 supra.
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ters abide by the cab-rank rule and demonstrates that the Bar does not
work on a first-come-first-served basis. Dissolving such myths helps
open the way to a more accurate assessment of the legitimacy of barrister claims to a variety of special advantages, including immunity
from liability for malpractice and exclusivity of audience in the high
courts. 32
Flood also deserves praise for the candor with which he describes
his research methods and experience. 33 In a long appendix entitled
"Biography of a Research Project," Flood provides a detailed description of his work. His exacting description of his feelings and techniques make it possible for the reader to identify both the advantages
and drawbacks of his warm relations with the clerks. 34
The strengths of Flood's book - its mass of detail, wealth of anecdotal material and empathy with its subjects - also give rise to a
number of serious weaknesses. Concentration on detail and anecdote
keeps Flood from providing the "systematic study" he says is needed
(p. 1). A preoccupation with the present inhibits Flood from carefully
examining the historical context in which the clerk system developed.
Without an historical framework Flood is hard-pressed to comprehend all the implications of what he sees.
Although historians have seldom directly addressed the question
of the development of barristers' clerks35 there is, in historical works
concerning the Bar, an abundance of information bearing upon the
question. A single example should suffice to demonstrate the utility of
such historical data. Raymond Cocks, in his recent examination of
the development of the Bar36 suggests that during the nineteenth century there was a dramatic shift in the way legal business was conducted in England. 37 At the start of the 1800's, barristers generally
practiced alone or with a small group of friends. Virtually every barrister had his own clerk and office. By the end of the century barristers no longer practiced in this way but had organized themselves into
32. Flood notes that the Bar has generally relied on the cab-rank rule to justify its right to
exclusive audience. P. 80. Lord Denning appears to rely on the same principle to justify barristers' immunity from malpractice claims. See Ronde! v. W., [1966] 3 All E.R. 657, 665 (C.A,
1966), affd. sub nom. Ronde! v. Worsley, [1967] 3 All E.R. 993 (H.L. 1967).
33. I am grateful to Professor Myron Glazer for bringing this point to my attention. For a
sensitive analysis of the interpersonal problems posed by field research, see M. GLAZER, THE
REsEARCH ADVENTURE (1972).
34. An expanded description of Flood's research methodology appears in Flood, Researching
Barrister's [sic] Clerks, in LAW AND SOCIAL ENQUIRY: CASE SnJDJES OF REsEARCH 158 (R,
Luckham ed. 1981).
35. Flood demonstrates the difficulty of finding sources that directly examine the history of
barristers' clerks. Even Holdsworth's encyclopedic A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW does not seem
to address the question. P. 14 n.26. But see note 36 infra and accompanying text.
36. R. COCKS, FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN BAR (1983). The following discussion of
historical material is drawn from Cocks's work.
37. Id. at 9-10.
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chambers run by senior barristers and managed by a single clerk. The
suggestion Cocks makes about this change is that it reflects the growing desire of Victorian barristers to ensure the stability of the Bar
against any unsettling influence that might be exerted by younger barristers (who were then coming into the profession in large numbers). 38
Chambers appear, at least in part, to represent the imposition of a
hierarchical mechanism to curb junior barristers and assure the continuing power of their elders. This historical information provides a
valuable context in which to view the present relations between clerks
and young barristers. Although Flood recognizes that clerks are used
to "filter" and control young barristers he fails to understand the
broader context in which this is taking place. Flood's narrowness of
vision leads him to ascribe too much power and importance to the
clerks when, in reality, they are the pawns of a Bar dedicated throughout much of its recent history to the perpetuation of the power of its
senior members.
Flood's empathy with the clerks helps him understand and explain
much of their behavior. However, this warmth of feeling clouds his
judgment on a number of issues. Flood accepts as true certain of the
myths clerks have propagated about themselves. Perhaps most unfortunate is his acceptance of the clerks' view that they are puppet-masters who manipulate their barristers' lives. 39 Flood's own evidence
suggests the limited value of this image. Senior barristers are generally
free of their clerks' control. They can and do refuse to handle matters
scheduled for them by their clerks (p. 43), dispute fees fixed by their
clerks (pp. 43-44) and delay payment of commissions owed to their
clerks (p. 51). Senior members of the Bar have also acted collegially in
derogation of the clerks' interests, as in the period 1969-1970, when
the separate clerk's fee was abolished and the groundwork laid for reducing the size of commissions (pp. 124-26).
It is the young barrister, then, over whom the clerk exerts the
greatest power. Even in this setting, however, the clerk's power is subject to a variety of limits. Unfortunately, Flood does not adequately
consider these limits. For example, much of a barrister's early work is
directed to him by senior members of chambers without the mediation
of the clerk. Often senior barristers will have their young colleagues
prepare cases or write opinions for them. This subcontracting procedure is called "devilling" and accounts for a not insignificant part of a
young barrister's early income and experience.40 The young barrister
who serves one of his seniors as "devil" is building his reputation and
38. Id.

39. Flood's attitude is best illustrated by the drawing on the book's dust jacket, which depicts
a clerk pulling the strings that control a gesticulating barrister.
40. "Devilling" has been defined as:
The well-established custom at the English Bar . . . of obtaining assistance from another
barrister in drafting and researching the relevant tract of law, in which case the barrister
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income without the clerk's intercession. Further, favorable impressions formed during a young barrister's pupilage may help secure his
or her position with senior barristers and limit the scope of the clerk's
authority. 41 Finally, as much as one-half the legal work handled by
barristers is paid for by the government rather than private parties.42
In cases involving government payments work is garnered and fees
fixed with very little intercession by the clerk. These considerations do
not demonstrate that clerks have no power over young barristers but
do suggest that there are significant limits on the clerks' power, especially when senior barristers choose to exercise countervailing
authority.
Accepting the myth of mastery not only leads to inaccuracy about
the clerks' power but to the exceptionable conclusion that clerks are
responsible for much of the prejudicial behavior encountered by women and members of minority groups who seek to practice law. An
analysis less committed to the proposition of clerk control would have
been more likely to pursue the observed coincidence between barristers' and clerks' biases (p. 132). Apropos of this observation it may be
said of prejudice, as of so much else affecting the Bar, that the clerks
are used by senior barristers to handle their "dirty work." Thus, it
would seem more fair to blame the Bar for prejudice than to hold the
clerks responsible.
Flood's preoccupation with the clerks causes other problems as
well. It deprives him of information essential to a full understanding
of the clerks' place in the legal system. Flood so closely identifies with
his subjects that he sees barristers as menacing adversaries43 and
makes little effort to talk to members of the Bar for fear that his clerk
friends will think he has been "contaminated" by such contacts (p.
136). The absence of barristers' opinions robs Barristers' Clerks of a
valuable perspective. It leads Flood to lend excessive credence to the
clerks' assertions about their authority.
Flood's allegiance to the clerks also distorts his perception of the
part solicitors play in the legal process. He accepts the clerks' view
that they themselves are the business getters responsible for the flow of
cases into chambers. A careful examination of solicitors' opinions
might have undermined this view. Flood admits that it is hard to meainstructed remains responsible for the work done. A barrister who employs a devil must pay
adequate and reasonable remuneration for the work actually done.
OXFORD CoMPANION TO THE LAW 354 (D. Walker ed. 1980). Devilling is permissible in a
variety of settings, see W. BOULTON, supra note 12, at 27-29, and is an especially important
source of work for young barristers. See B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, supra note 12, at 109.
41. See R. MEGARRY, supra note 18, at 35-36.
42. See note 28 supra; Hazell, supra note 10, at 109 (with the advent of government financing, the fee negotiating function of the clerk has declined in importance),
43. Flood seldom refers to conversations with barristers. The lengthiest reference of this sort
involves a remarkably unpleasant cross-examination. In this hostile exchange the barrister is
depicted as a threatening inquisitor suspicious of Flood's work. See pp. 147-48.
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sure the efficacy of clerks' activities in generating business (p. 24), and
that overt touting has declined in recent years (p. 74). He clings, however, to the conviction that clerks are vital to the development of business. This view discounts solicitor loyalty to certain chambers or
barristers and fails to consider solicitors' views on the ways they approach the problem of selecting counsel. A careful examination of solicitors' opinions rather than an acceptance of the clerks' position
might have shed more light on the question.
Finally, although most of Barristers' Clerks is written in a clear
and accessible style, the jargon of an ethnographic study sometimes
creeps in to mar the quality of the presentation. Phrases from the sociological literature like "cooled out"44 intrude into the text without adequate definition. Although most such phrases are eventually
explained, the reader may be kept in the dark for many pages. Similarly annoying is Flood's tendency in the "Conclusion" sections of several of his chapters to superimpose a sociological interpretation on his
materials when that interpretation is either unsupported by the preceding text or is only tenuously tied to what has come before.
IV.

THE ISOLATION OF THE ENGLISH BAR

One of Flood's most important conclusions is that "[t]he Bar
maintains clean hands while the clerks do its dirty work" (p. 133).
This pattern is reflected in the solicitation of business, the management of young barristers, and the processing of cases. It has the most
serious implications for the English legal profession because it means
that at almost every turn barristers segregate themselves from contact
with the world around them. They seldom deal directly with clients,
solicitors or court officials; the members of each of these groups are
held at arm's length or dealt with by the clerks. Clients have virtually
no means of influencing their barristers' behavior. Indeed, lay clients
can only obtain a barrister's assistance through the intercession of a
solicitor. Economic leverage is nonexistent45 and there are virtually
no legal remedies for the dissatisfied. 46 Solicitors are also kept at a
distance. Much of the communication between barristers and solicitors is handled through written instructions.47 Seldom is there any
44. ''Those [young clerks] who are not prepared to wait ..• can be 'cooled out' with little
regard for their feelings." P. 27.
45. See text at notes 16-17 supra.
46. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
47. Benjamin Kaplan neatly described the process of communication between barrister and
solicitor:
In a case of consequence, the solicitor will have retained a barrister to settle the pleadings.
When the case has been set down for trial, or perhaps earlier, the advice of a barrister is
sought "on the evidence": he is handed a bundle consisting of witnesses' statements and
other material assembled by the solicitor, with perhaps some commentary subjoined. The
barrister is to advise how the case can be strengthened for trial; he may suggest that further
questions be put to witnesses or that the theory of claim or defense be shifted, which may
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sustained dialogue, and on the crucial question of fees no communication whatsoever is permitted. Nor do barristers have any contact with
court administrators. All dealings concerning the processing of cases
are handled by the clerks (pp. 85-96). The barristers' isolation is accentuated by their unique style of dress, mode of speech and general
demeanor in the courtroom.48
Senior barristers' relations with their younger colleagues reflect a
similar pattern. Unless older advocates are interested in exploiting the
services of juniors in circumstances like devilling, the young are likely
to be kept at a distance. Young barristers' careers are managed by
clerks who serve as the chief target of criticism if anything goes wrong.
The clerks do the disagreeable jobs of removing unsuccessful candidates and placating less successful practitioners. The senior members
of chambers are seldom required to attend to these problems. The
system assures that senior barristers will not have to assume any responsibility for the development of their juniors unless they choose to
do so.
The cost of such isolation is considerable. England, like the
United States, relies on the adversary process. One of the premises of
this process is that litigants control their cases.49 Litigant control has a
variety of advantages, including enhanced prospects of litigant satisfaction, 50 increased likelihood that the courts will identify and decide
the questions the litigants see as fundamental 51 and improved prospects that counsel will zealously represent each client's interests. 52
The isolation of barristers vitiates these advantages. Satisfaction is not
likely to be enhanced when the parties are removed from the management of their cases. Similarly, responsiveness to the fundamental con-'
call for investigation on a new line with possible amendment of the pleadings. Finally, the
barrister receives the brief for trial. The bundle of papers now reappears, perhaps enlarged
and improved. Besides poring over this material, the barrister will probably interview the
lay client and any experts appearing on his side; according to protocol he will not see them
alone but in the solicitor's presence. But the understood professional canon prohibits him
ordinarily from seeing the other witnesses whom he will be calling to give evidence. And he
will usually have no pretrial recourse, even secondhand through his instructing solicitor, to
the witnesses who will be called on the other side; he may indeed be ignorant of their
identity.
Kaplan, An American Lawyer in the Queen's Courts: Impressions of English Civil Procedure, 69
MICH. L. REV. 821, 831 (1971).
48. See Hazell, Preface, THE BAR ON 1'RIAL, supra note 10, at 12; see also R. MEGARRY,
supra note 18, at 14 ("Clients rarely get close enough to [a barrister's] shoulder to weep upon
it . . . •").
49. See Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and
Certain Justice has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 487, 52S
(1980).
50. See J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
77-80 (1975); Adams, Towards a Mobilization of the Adversary Process, 12 OsooooE HALL L. J.
569, S16 (1974).
51. See Adams, supra note SO, at S76-77; Lea & Walker, Efficient Procedure, 51 N.C. L.
REV. 361, 376 (1979).
52. See D. MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 270-74 (1973).
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cerns of litigants is likely to be impaired when trial counsel avoid
contacts with clients that facilitate the identification of such concerns.
In 1821, Lord Brougham was engaged to defend Queen Caroline in
a case charging her with adultery. During that proceeding Brougham
had occasion to articulate what he though to be the standard of representation required in an adversary proceeding. He said:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and,
amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing
this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction
which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from
that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though it
should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion. 53

It is significant that Brougham's statement was never endorsed by the
English Bar. 54 Its view seems to be a cooler one stressing the separation of counsel from client rather than their identity. 55 The absence of
zealous commitment to each client increases the prospect that counsel
will give his or her first allegiance to the court. This in turn may produce a system more concerned with society's generalized interests than
with each individual's claims. 56
Isolation also has an effect on the quality of the work performed by
barristers. Because barristers have little intimate contact with clients,
it is unlikely that they will form a passionate attachment to any client's cause. The absence of intense commitment increases the likelihood of late withdrawal from representation. The frequency with
which briefs are returned underscores the barristers' lack of attach53. 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821), quoted in D. MELLINKOFF, supra note 52, at 189.
54. See D. MELLINKOFF, supra note·52, at 189, 272-73. I do not mean to suggest that Lord
Brougham's view is universally accepted in America, however. The quoted passage has influential detractors. See, e.g., Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1031, 1036 (1975).

55. See, e.g., W. BOULTON, supra note 12, at 70-78.
56. In Rondel v. W., [1966] 3 All E.R. 657, 665 (C.A. 1966), ajfd. sub nom. Ronde! v.
Worsley, [1967] 3 All E.R. 993 (H.L. 1967), Lord Denning emphasized the barrister's allegiance
to the court:
He has a duty to the court which is paramount. It is a mistake to suppose that he is the
mouthpiece of his client to.say what he wants: or his tool to do what he directs. He is none
of these things. He owes allegiance to a higher cause. It is the cause of truth and justice.
He must not consciously mis-state the facts. He must not knowingly conceal the truth. He
must not unjustly make a charge of fraud, that is, without evidence to support it. He must
produce all the relevant authorities, even those that are against him. He must see that his
client discloses, if ordered, the relevant documents, even those that are fatal to his case. He
must disregard the most specific instructions of his client, if they conflict with his duty to the
court. The code which requires a barrister to do all this is not a code oflaw. It is a code of
honour. Ifhe breaks it, he is offending against the rules of the profession and is subject to its
discipline • • . .
See also Rondel v. Worsley, [1967] 3 All E.R. 993, 998-99 (H.L. 1967) (Lord Reid stressing duty
of barristers to courts); R. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 454.
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ment57 and often results in the handling of cases by barristers who
have had extremely little time to prepare. Not only does the quality of
representation suffer in these circumstances but the value of each case
is diminished in the barristers' eyes. As Flood observes, the return of
briefs "dehumanise[s] the clients' cases" (p. 72).
Isolation fosters stagnation within the Bar. New ideas and methods are fenced out. Judgments are likely to be based on long-lived
traditions preserved by barristers insulated from change. The conservatism of the Bar can be a valuable asset, especially when it works to
preserve institutions vital to the defense of citizens' rights. 58 It can,
however, prove disastrous when it operates to preserve antiquated
practices of value to no one but the Bar. An unfortunately large part
of the activity of the English Bar has been devoted to the defense of
arcana. 59 Reform has been painfully slow and old methods have been
preserved long beyond the time of their utility.
Connected with the Bar's conservatism is its tendency to perpetuate a number of misleading myths about itself. These myths make a
penetrating analysis of present conditions exceedingly difficult. One
among many such myths is the cab-rank rule. The first-come-firstserved principle has been relied upon as one of the chief justifications
for the barristers' rights to exclusive audience before the high courts
and freedom from liability for malpractice. 60 Yet as Flood convincingly demonstrates, the cab-rank rule is no longer operative. In light
of this finding, questions should be raised about the continuing propriety of exclusive audience and freedom from malpractice liability.
These questions, however, have not been raised within the Bar.
Finally, isolation tends to institutionalize prejudice against those
who traditionally have been excluded from the Bar. There is clear evidence that both women and ethnic minorities have been discriminated
against in their efforts to become barristers. 61 Unfortunately, the
structure of the English legal system has deflected much of the criticism about prejudice from barristers to their clerks. This has insulated
57. See text following note 29 supra. The practice of returning briefs is specifically recognized in the barristers' rules of etiquette. See W. BOULTON, supra note 12, at 21 ("Briefs are as a
rule delivered and accepted on the understanding that it is possible that a counsel may be pre•
vented from attending the case."). Both critics of and apologists for the English Bar have, however, sharply criticized the frequency of returns. See R. MEGARRY, supra note 18, at 77-78
(return of briefs imposes serious burdens on clients and can influence quality of advocacy); M.
Zander, supra note 4, at 184-87 (finding poor preparation in a very high proportion of criminal
cases in part because of late return of briefs).
58. See Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST.
L. J. 713, 739 (1983).
59. See B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS 79-110 (1967); R.
CocKS, supra note 36, at 85-102.
60. See note 32 supra.
61. See M. ZANDER, supra note 24, at 88 (women barristers earn less than their male coun•
terparts at every level of practice); Kennedy, Women at the Bar, in THE BAR ON TRIAL, supra
note 10, at 150-S6.
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the Bar from pressure to make meaningful change. While the American Bar has not been a paragon of equal opportunity, 62 it has proved
amenable to pressure for social change. The same cannot be said of
the English Bar. Its aloofness has fostered continuing discrimination.
Readers should not go to Barristers' Clerks in the hope of finding a
general exposition of English legal practice. Rather, what it provides
is a detailed analysis of a small community within the English system.
Careful scrutiny of that community reveals a- great deal about the way
English advocates go about their job. It also supplies us with fresh
insights into why barristers act the way they do. Such information is a
valuable resource, because it helps us to understand the system better
and because it provides us a basis upon which to fashion intelligent
criticisms of existing attitudes and structures.

62. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984); see generally J. AUERBACH,
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976).

